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Introduction
Recent sociological literature has been rich in accounts of the development of networks 
of corruption, from broad theoretical explanations of the genesis of corrupt networks (Gambetta, 
1996; Volkov, 2002), to explanations of the not always recognized functions of illegal activity for 
their participants (Bourgois, 1995) and the areas in which they operate (Sanchez-Jankowski, 1992). 
A broad literature presents economic activity outside of the framework of legal regulation as a 
problem, both in terms of the functioning of institutions and in terms of the development of stable 
political orders and commercial market in the “countries in transition” from the command economy 
structures of state socialism (Karklins, 2005).
Another approach which is no less current, but certainly less well represented in policy-
oriented literature, is one which emphasizes the functions of extralegal economic exchange in 
facilitating the operation of markets (Grossman, 1995; Tanzi, 1995). This is especially the case in 
environments where the framework of legal regulation is unstable or unclear, where regulatory 
authorities tend to act unpredictably or seek to extend control over the operation of markets, or where 
the cost and complexity of compliance with the law can be greater than the cost and complexity of 
seeking alternatives (Radaev, 2002). To a greater or lesser degree, such conditions obtain in much of 
the post-socialist world.
It is therefore not surprising that economies in this part of the world should see an explosion 
of a wide-scale market for bureaucratic services intermediaries, facilitating informal relations between 
businesses and state authorities. In the area where the present study is conducted, this is confirmed 
by a study of corruption in small and medium business in St. Petersburg conducted by the Center 
for Independent Social Research in 2003-2004.1 We seek to understand, explain, and set out the 
dimensions of this “intermediaries’ boom.”
There is of course nothing unique about the Russian economy or any of the other economies in 
“transition” in terms of the existence of intermediary services. In established capitalist economies, the 
role of intermediaries has been legitimized and routinized to a large degree, with many transactions 
depending on the involvement of brokers, attorneys, agents, and other individuals specialized in 
complex rules and bureaucratic procedures. It may be possible to regard the emergence of such 
1 The project «Prospects for Fighting Corruption in Post Socialist Countries: Cases of Russia and Hungary» was carried out in 2003-
2004 within the frame of Think Tank Partnership Program supported by USAID, IRIS and KPMG Consulting Barents Group.
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mediating services as evidence of functional specialization and hence as a normal development of 
the market from the economic point of view.
However, our research demonstrates a crucial difference between the mediating system 
in established capitalist economies and in Russia. While the main purpose of intermediaries in 
the West is to assist in meeting the requirements imposed by bureaucratic procedures, which are 
too complicated for non-specialists and require the mastery of arcane details, in Russia mediating 
services serve more often as a screen, functioning in fact as a hidden form of rewarding officials 
for accelerating bureaucratic procedures or for “closing their eyes” to discrepancies between formal 
norms and real practices.
methodology
Both studies providing empirical data for this paper were conducted from the perspective 
of qualitative research methodology. The study of corruption in small and medium business in St. 
Petersburg included about 30 in-depth interviews with business representatives - top managers and 
key persons in different kinds of business organizations – regarding various informal aspects of their 
relationships with officials. The following study “Intermediaries’ Boom and Informal Relationships in 
the Business Sphere and Everyday life” was focused precisely on intermediaries and mediating services 
provided for solving problems between businessmen and officials. Two cases of intermediary services 
were chosen as the objects to be studied: customs brokers serving small and medium business in doing 
custom clearance, and tourist firms that perform as mediators for shuttle traders in their relationships 
with customs on the Russian-Finnish border. We used as a main research method for study of customs 
brokers in-depth interviews with different groups of actors involved in the custom clearance process (12 
interviews were conducted with brokers, businessmen and customs officials). In case of shuttle traders 
the main research method was participant observation in shuttle buses going from St. Petersburg to 
different towns in Finland complemented by interviews with shuttle traders, bus drivers, tourist guides 
and other representatives of tourist firms specialized on shop-tours to Finland. Although our studies 
were focused on the St. Petersburg municipality alone, the outcomes received in the course of the 
study are not specific to St. Petersburg and could be reasonably extrapolated to describe phenomena 
throughout the Russian business sphere, particularly those involving small and medium sized business.
In this article we will focus on intermediaries that operate in the sphere of cross border cargo 
transportation by assisting cargo carriers in their interactions with customs officials. Complicated 
and intricate customs rules exist in every country – not only Russia – and that is why cargo carriers 
in all countries resort to the help of customs brokers who act as intermediaries. However, the role of 
customs brokers in Russia is not so much to assist businessmen in going through customs formalities, 
but to manipulate the system to reduce cargo costs and accelerate the process via informal channels. 
A special market of informal customs services has been formed in which customs brokers offer 
businessmen a wide spectrum of possible customs schemes – from “light-gray” to “fast black” 
(the cheaper the scheme, the longer it takes and the less the risk). While doing this, brokers take 
responsibility for substantiating the declared cost of the cargo, making use of informal agreements 
with customs officials.2 For instance, if computers are declared in official documents by brokers as 
2 See, for example, Radaev V.V. «Tamozhnja daet dobro? Rossijskis biznes na puti k legalizatzii». In: Olimpieva I., Pachenkov 
O.(eds) «neformalnaja ekonomika v postsovetskom prostranstve: problemy issledovanija i regulirovanija», SPb: CNSI, 2003, 
P. 57, Barsukova, S. Tamozhnnya i biznes: ot tenevogo tandema k legalizatsii? In: Mir Rossii 2002, N 2, S. 70-92 and others.
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frozen vegetables, then customs officials in most cases know about it. However, they do not verify 
whether the actual cargo corresponds with what is declared in the documents because of their 
informal agreements with customs brokers.3
 Customs brokers operate as intermediaries for the “white” or official sector of cross-border 
cargo transportation. There is also a significant informal sector of cross-border trading – so called 
shuttle traders who also need informal intermediaries’ services for carrying cargo across the border. 
In spite of its informal character, shuttle trading is a well organized business which still provides the 
major part of consumer goods flows from Finland to the St. Petersburg market. So, another object 
of the study was intermediaries serving “gray” or shadow cross-border cargo carriers. The role of 
intermediaries for shuttle traders is performed by tourist agencies, more precisely by tourist guides 
organizing shopping tours. It is the job of the tourist guide to solve the problems that frequently 
emerge at customs (since shuttle traders always break custom norms regarding the allowed weight 
of cargo). For these purposes a tourist guide uses various informal means (including bribes or 
personal contacts with customs officials, etc). The role of a guide as an intermediary who can “solve 
the problems” is crucial for shuttle traders. In this sense, it could be stated that the ability to regulate 
or anticipate how strict the customs control on the border will be is considered to be one of the main 
competitive advantages of a tourist agency offering shopping tours to Finland.
 
The discussion begins by describing the phenomenon of informal mediation using 
empirical evidence drawn from the studies. We provide examples of the different types of informal 
intermediaries and of differences between them, using examples from our study of corruption in 
small business. The emphasis then shifts more precisely to informal mediating services hidden 
behind the official or formal activities of customs brokers and tourist agencies. The analysis then 
moves to a consideration, based on the empirical data, of the process of institutionalization of 
informal mediation in the Russian business environment. Using different analytical approaches we 
will attempt then to reveal the reasons behind the emergence of this phenomenon, the importance of 
informal mediation as economic institution and differences between intermediaries operating in the 
Russian business environment and their counterparts in the West.
3 The best example is import of computers and other high-tech devices. Usually these products were imported as “green 
beans” which is the cheapest product in terms of import taxes. That is why according to official statistics Russian market in 
the mid-90s seemed to be heaped up with green beans, and at the same time there was almost no import of electronic devices 
– of course, in reality the picture was different. Radaev, 2003. 
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The “Intermediaries’ Boom”
In recent years there has been an explosive growth of mediation services (provided by either 
firms or individuals) assisting businesspeople in getting access to bureaucratic services. Interviews 
with businesspeople reveal numerous examples of intermediaries operating in different spheres of 
the economy. Some of them fully replace official bodies in contacts with businesspeople. To get 
permission from this or that bureaucratic body a businessmen appeals to intermediary firms instead 
of going to the responsible bureaucratic body, and from this firm he or she finally gets the desired 
document. The best example of this type of structure is provided by intermediaries providing 
services in the sphere of licensing (and certification). For our informants it is obvious that in order 
to get license or certificate it is better to avoid direct contacts with licensing and certification centers 
which complicate the procedure deliberately, and work instead through an intermediary firm, which 
will issue the same papers on the basis of the same documents, but for a different price:
Naturally, I have never seen anybody, but everything goes to a firm. We pay the firm, and 
they do everything. They collect all the necessary documents, which are simply bought, 
because nobody has so much time to collect all this – it would take me half a year! In reality 
nobody does anything but the documents are here, they are on official paper and look nice. 
From institutes and training centers, that somebody attended courses, passed the exams, 
commission accepted, etc… It turns out that this pyramid is specially built on an empty place. 
And these firms, they are created around those officials who deal with issuing licenses. There 
are about a dozen people involved, you know… If they bring this paper – it will be accepted 
[by the officials], if not– well, it won’t. It’s amazing!
(director of construction firm)
The study provides numerous examples demonstrating the same situation with other 
bureaucratic bodies – state monopolies for gas, electricity, water, and other utilities. According 
to our informants, the procedure of getting permissions from these structures can take several 
months (if not years). However, if a businessperson uses the services of an intermediary firm the 
problem can be solved in a few days – but for a different price.
The distinguishing feature of the intermediary firms described above is that they are 
specially created for mediation purposes. There is also another set of firms, which are specialized 
in different services, and at the same time fulfill informal mediating functions. Some real 
estate firms serve as intermediaries between businesses and the Department of State Property, 
distributing state-owned premises for rent at reduced prices. According the Program for the 
6
Informal Economies of St. Petersburg
Support of the Development of Small Business in St. Petersburg, renting state-owned premises 
is cheaper or sometimes even free for some small and medium sized enterprises. Access to these 
premises is limited. But real estate companies connected to the local administration can help in 
finding an appropriate state-owned premise for a low rental price. The condition is that a business 
will make monthly payments of additional money to this firm in black cash.4 Not only real estate 
firms mediate these relationships (as seen from the following quotation).
Q: Did you have any problems with officials in opening your shop?
A: Oh, horrible! There was a law firm at the district administration that offered us very good 
premises. But then it turned out… Well, we said in the very beginning that everything was 
official and we completed a cashless transfer. Nonetheless, we were told that “You need to bring 
$300 every month in cash anyway” [...]. And it was impossible to reject, because this firm is at 
the administration and we were told: We will simply not allow you to work in this district!
(director of the shop)
Indirect mediation is also provided by organizations operating around inspection agencies. 
These firms are not involved directly in the inspection process, however they provide services that 
become a condition for passing this or that inspection (or for avoiding additional inspections). 
The best examples here are fire protection and sanitary inspection:
«There are a lot of firms selling fire protection alarm systems with all necessary norms and 
rules. But we were told at the very beginning that: “you know, guys, even if you find a cheaper 
fire alarm system and install it following all formal requirements, it wouldn’t be accepted by 
the fire inspectors. Because we have a monopoly in this district. Such and such firm is selling 
alarm systems here, and the owner of this firm is a chief policeman of the district. That’s it.»
(director of a sewing shop)
«Accordingly, at the very beginning sanitary inspection conducted raids upon us, well, say 
– flying visits with insinuations5 […] then we begin to interact according to an informal 
agreement – we send our employees for medical examinations to a certain clinic which the 
inspectors indicate to us – for us it doesn’t matter to whom we pay this money. And I do not 
know what kind of connections they have got there.»
(director of a café)
It should be mentioned that the number of intermediaries who are specialized exclusively 
in informally mediating bureaucratic extortion is not as large as the number of firms that focus 
on “cutting the red tape.” The peculiarity of informal mediation is that it can be performed by 
absolutely legal firms specialized in various kinds of services. As a matter of fact, intermediaries 
combine in their activities overt functions and hidden or shadow functions. Therefore, from the 
official side (from the documents and official reports) these firms appear as ordinary business 
4 “Black cash” is a notion that can be related to Russian business environment of post-reform period. In a broad sense it means 
money in cash which is not registered in any official documents or accounts but which is used in business operations. “Black 
cash” is “invisible” in official documents of the firm’s turnover, and is not exposed to taxation, control or official accounting, 
or shown in any bank account. As a matter of fact “black cash” is used for informal inter-payments between businessmen.
5 «Flying visits» is a direct translation from the Russian, referring to unannounced visits by inspectors with a high probabil-
ity, whether justified or not, of finding violations likely to lead to a loss of certification.
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organizations, which run “normal” businesses (and they really do) – consulting, selling equipment, 
dealing in real estate, etc. At the same time, intermediaries fulfill shadow or hidden functions by 
facilitating informal relations between businesses and the state. So under informal mediation 
we refer only to the informal component of mediation functions, precisely – mediation services 
that are based on informal access to a bureaucratic structure (or to an individual bureaucrat). 
Therefore the main problem here is to separate the strictly legal functions of intermediaries from 
the informal ones.
The intermediary structures described in the previous sections have one common feature 
– all of them serve the process of bureaucratic extortion, and the initiative to create such firms 
comes “from above”. Officials prefer dealing with intermediary firms because in this case they 
do not have to enter a rather risky corruption market personally. The use of “independent” 
organizations and firms changes the appearance of the interaction, reshaping it from a corrupt 
deal to an official procedure. It also narrows the circle of people communicating with an official 
directly and creates a protective barrier from undesirable “outsiders.”
In the next part of the presentation we will focus on another type of intermediary, the 
emergence of which can be seen as a “bottom-up” process, serving businesspeople in their 
attempts to avoid excessively demanding formal rules and requirements. This does not mean that 
officials are not involved in the process at all, indeed, as with any kind of informal mediation this 
service becomes possible exclusively due to the “good will” of officials, their readiness to “close 
their eyes” to some infringements of formal norms and procedures, and their informal personal 
relationships with intermediaries. However, informal intermediaries of this type act “on the side 
of businesses” rather than “on the side of officials,” and this is what distinguishes them from 
intermediaries facilitating bureaucratic extortion.
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Customs Brokers  
as Informal Intermediaries
Customs brokers represent the most explicit example of combining formal and informal 
mediating functions in everyday business operations. Correspondingly the terminology of a “white-
gray-black” spectrum is widely used in public discourse to indicate the status of customs brokers. The 
following section sets out the distinctions on the continuum from “white” to “gray” and “black.”
legal status of customs brokers:  
white, gray and black customs brokers
From a legal point of view all customs brokers can only be “white.” The label “customs 
broker” implies that the firm possesses a broker’s license and insurance, certified personnel and 
official accreditation at customs. According to the new Customs Code, in order to get a license and 
be listed in the State Register of Custom Brokers, a firm should pay a deposit of 50 million rubles 
(about 1,6 million USD) and carry 20 million rubles of insurance. Only big firms (mainly the 
branches of international or all-Russian brokerage companies) can afford the cost of deposit and 
insurance. The alternative way for a customs broker to operate legally is to get a guarantee of the 
Regional Association of Custom Brokers of Northwest (to be included in the List of the Persons 
Dealing in Customs which is agreed between the Association and the St. Petersburg customs 
agency). Although membership in the Association is rather expensive for medium and small 
customs brokerage firms — the entrance fee is about $2000 (the National Brokers’ Association 
fee is $5000), it is considered as a real option to gain access to legal operation in the market. As a 
result of toughening the rules the number of officially registered customs brokers operating in the 
Northwest customs region sharply decreased in 2004 when the new Customs Code came into effect. 
At the moment only about 10 big companies operating in St. Petersburg customs have licenses and 
are listed in the state Registry of Customs Brokers (compared to 212 customs brokers in 2003). 
Another consequence of the new customs regulation has been an increase in the prices of customs 
services, which makes them unaffordable for the majority of small and medium sized enterprises. 
In this respect, business owners are forced to resort to informal (gray) customs brokers.
Where do gray customs brokers come from? According to the new Customs Code the 
owners of cargo (declarants) are eligible to do custom clearance themselves.6 This opens up the 
6 Big firms that regularly convey big amount of homogeneous cargo (like, for example, “Valio”) submit custom declarations 
without any assistance of custom brokers. In this case a firm-declarant has to possess the updated software support (which is 
constantly changing) and a special department for custom clearance or special staff dealing with customs declarations.
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legal possibility for situations in which some specialized firms, which do not have any license for 
customs brokerage activities, do all the work of customs clearance on behalf of a declarant. Very 
often the role of gray brokers is played by transportation firms that fill in and submit customs 
declarations (and solve problems with customs) on behalf of their clients.
“We can be labeled as gray brokers. The real broker is some juridical person (organization) that 
possesses a license to represent the interests of some third person in the customs. Especially for 
this purpose! This juridical person should possess some, say, a set of instruments beginning with 
insurance plus this firm should have an approved software package, some special accounting 
documents, to be accredited somewhere and so on. And this firm is eligible to conclude a 
special agreement with a third person – a brokerage agreement. This is an official agreement, 
according to which it can do registration of cargo on behalf of third person. Correspondingly, 
the cargo customs declaration (CCD) – which is the main document at customs – is signed 
by this juridical person, not by the client. … All this we call a real brokerage. Now imagine 
that we do all the same things. That means we have the same package of documents, the same 
CCD, but we bring all these documents to …say… the top manager of our client firm and he 
signs it because he trusts us. So the CCD is sealed and signed by the client but we do all the 
real work [of customs clearance]”.
(director of a transportation firm)
Relationships with gray customs brokers imply an extremely high level of trust. The reason 
is that gray brokers do not sign the customs declaration. Instead it is signed by the top-manager 
of the client firm who bears full responsibility for it. However, an informal regulative mechanism 
based on relationships of personal trust and the maintenance of a respectable image in business 
circles seems to be even more effective than any official rules and formal punishments:
They do nothing, just put their signature, but this requires high level of trust between us. This is 
like family relationships – you trust a person and you live with him. If you don’t trust – then it is 
better to divorce. This is what we call a “gray brokerage” because a client doesn’t really understand 
what he signs. If the customs filed some charges they would be directed to the client – not to the 
gray broker. That is why I would say the responsibility in this case is even higher – if you lose your 
good name in these circles nobody would deal with you any more. I am not saying here that you 
can just get the lead put in you, but definitely people wouldn’t do any business with you.
(gray broker)
That is the reason why the clients — cargo owners — often do not even care about the 
official status or affiliation of a customs broker. Sometimes they do not care either about the legal 
status or even the name of the firm they deal with. For them the crucial point is not a firm but a 
concrete person – a trustworthy and use-proven specialist.
The name of a firm does not matter, the main role is played by a concrete person… I never 
check the credit history of a broker – what was in his past, what kind of cargo he dealt with, 
who are his clients at the moment – none of all this. Because you never can be sure that the 
answers to all these questions will find you the real broker.
I know N and that’s enough for me. I don’t even know the name of his firm.
(director of a firm, cargo-owner)
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Transportation companies that substitute brokers in their relationships with customs can 
be called “forced brokers”, as they do not consider these functions as main activity but only as 
additional services aimed to “optimize” (speed up) cargo transportation across the border. These 
firms do not advertise their broker activities and as a matter of fact do customs clearance only for 
their clients who use transportation services.
Not only transportation firms can play the role of gray brokers. Another type of gray 
brokers is represented by individual experts on customs clearance who offer their services on a 
completely informal basis (“informal/gray experts”), using trust and interpersonal relations with a 
client. In their work they rely not only on expert knowledge about customs clearance procedures, 
but also on informal contacts with customs officials based on their past experience (the role of 
informal contacts with customs will be described below). Since gray experts work individually 
and informally they provide their services for comparatively much lower prices.
There is a person, a man with good contacts… say a former customs official,...who was fired 
from there or just left himself … He simply stays at home, he has a computer at home. And 
he just has relationships with some firm– some logging company — and he does everything 
[customs clearance] using the seal and signature of that company, but he works at home. No 
taxes are paid, nothing at all. Only black cash. He can also enlist other specialists: “Vasya, 
can you calculate this or that for me?” Vasya also sits at home at the computer, calculating 
payments – and that’s the job. … And again – when a firm is making its choice among the 
brokers, then if it resorts to official firm the declaration will cost 250 or 1000 USD, yes…and 
this guy will do everything for 100! What would they choose? Right! He says: “I am not able to 
do a broker declaration, but under your seal – no problem!”
As for “black brokers” we did not find any of them existing as particular organizational/
institutional or individual entities. Under the term “black brokers” our informants usually imply 
corrupt officials – bribe-takers among custom officials or border guards who help carrier firms 
to convey cargo across the border without any registration when truck simply “disappears” after 
crossing the border and does not show up at the internal customs point for custom clearance. This 
does not mean that all of the cargo conveyed in this way is necessarily contraband forbidden for 
import. The reason may be a discrepancy in the documentation of the cargo (perhaps if it has 
“informal origins”) or it may simply be a way to avoid customs payments in order to increase profits. 
These practices were widely used in the beginning and middle of the nineties but they are not so 
widespread today. Our informants consider black brokerage as criminal and negative, they strictly 
distance themselves from this kind of activity calling it “a partisans’ path or bribes on the border”.
“white”, “gray” and “black” schemas
Although the terms “white, gray and black brokers” are widely used in public discourse 
they fail to describe the whole range of real interrelationships at customs. Our interviews indicate 
that the “white” status of customs brokers does not mean that they always strictly follow the rules. 
Besides, the “white status” of a custom broker matters only for a considerably narrow circle of 
mainly big and successful firms or foreign firms that run “white” business (“we are white therefore 
we need a white custom broker”).
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In case of legal (white) customs clearance the amount of cargo, its weight, content and price 
strictly correspond to what is declared in the customs documents; customs payments are paid 
completely according to Customs regulations. There is also a wide spectrum of “gray schemas” 
which are used by all brokers – whether white or gray. Gray schemas mean that while making 
up customs declaration some infringement of legal rules or norms is committed. Gray schemas 
are used in order to speed up the process of customs clearance or to reduce the overall “customs 
expenses” paid by the cargo owner. The coloration of gray schemas can be lighter or darker 
depending on the degree of the violation of legal norms.
The most widespread way to reduce customs payments is to change the declared 
characteristics of cargo without changing the commodity group. Slightly changing the type of 
cargo can essentially reduce the minimum customs cost of imported goods that form the basis for 
the calculation of custom payments.
“Well, he says, let’s decide,” and looks at you attentively, “Probably this paint is not water-
base, but synthetic polymer-base?!” You say – Yes, yes! He says: “Oh, and the minimum 
custom cost of this kind of goods is $1”. You say, it is fine with you, that you declared this 
paint as nitrophtalic but in fact it is synthetic-based paint.
So, we looked attentively through the guide, and defined the commodity group using the ten-
symbol code. Although one can find another classification in the guide that can also fit this 
group ... Because you would never classify cargo with 100% guarantee.
This is the most “secure” way to reduce customs payments, as it is always possible to prove 
that this particular commodity can be identified according to this particular classification in 
commodity guide. The role of the customs broker in this case is extremely important. Due to his 
expert knowledge of the constantly changing normative basis and experience he can offer to a 
client a number of convincing options for the identification of commodities.
Another informal way of reducing customs cost of cargo is a fundamental replacement of 
one custom code (commodity group) by another. This schema is closer to the black one because in 
this case deliberate deception is obvious (the most typical example is when “coffee is declared as 
green beans”). Customs brokers consider this schema as contraband (in brokers’ argot it sounds 
like «contrabass»). The custom duties paid for “green beans” are much lower and the “savings” are 
shared between the customs broker, customs official, and declarant (cargo owner).
No less risky is a gray schema based on underestimation of the weight of the declared 
cargo. This schema is used for commodities which are difficult to measure – for instance, for cut 
timber, where overmeasures are difficult to identify.
It can be concluded that white brokers are equally active in using gray schemas as gray 
brokers. We assume also that white brokers play the main role in developing gray schemas used for 
reducing invoice prices. All this can explain why legal (white) custom brokers often prefer to avoid 
signing declarations, operating instead as ‘gray” brokers using the signature of their clients:
It should be mentioned that white brokers mainly do not like to put their signature on the 
documents, and they try to do everything like the gray brokers. They make up the same cargo 
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customs declaration but do their best to get the client’s signature under it. There is some 
intrigue in all this. They do some [white] activity as a blind, or with some clients, but actually 
try to incline a client to sign and seal [the declaration], which means that for them all their 
diplomas and licenses just serve as an umbrella for their gray activities. Of course, I cannot 
prove my estimations but I would definitely say that for more than half of the cargo that 
passes through customs gray schemas are used. And the lions’ share of this half is made up by 
white brokers who use gray methods.
Black schemas include (aside from the already mentioned “disappearance” of cargo after 
crossing the border) so-called “galimy contrabass” (absolute/pure contraband). Under black schemas 
our informants mean cases when commodities prohibited for export/or import are hidden inside 
some regular cargo – for instance, vodka or cigarettes are hidden in cut timber. Another case is 
flagrant violation of the rules of cargo indication, such as massively underreporting the value of 
cargo. These devices are also referred to by our informants as “black schemas” (for instance when 
computers are declared as green beans).
We can not be completely certain that none of our informants ever use black schemas 
but generally these practices are condemned. Transportation firms (gray brokers) are afraid of 
contraband and wary of container traffic, especially in sealed containers, they prefer to deal with 
none-sealed cargo that they can check at the stage of loading.
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Relationships with Customs
To “catch” the informal component of customs brokers’ mediation it is necessary to consider 
relationships between customs brokers and customs officials. The leitmotif of all interviews with 
businesspeople is that informal relationships of trust with customs officials are a key point in 
customs clearance procedure. This is true not only for the implementation of “gray schemas,” but 
for any kind of customs clearance operations. The informal role of customs brokers is explicitly 
described by one respondent:
“Actually there is no real need for the assistance of a so-called customs broker or declarant. 
You can easily fill in the declaration especially if you constantly convey one particular type 
of cargo and are not doing it for the first time. But his [broker’s] main role (why he is really 
needed) begins after you fill in the declaration. He is like a messenger of God on the earth. 
In other words, he is the person who goes to customs with your documents, and the customs 
would decide whether to let your cargo through or not. And, then, imagine that you come 
to customs and bring your documents yourself. A custom official wonders – who is this 
stranger? Where did he come from?” … And it is quite a different situation if a declarant 
[broker] comes and says: “everything is fine, the inspection is done, we can go.” It is clear that 
your payment – agreed payment – is shared between them. Because if the declarant [customs 
broker] didn’t pay then he would be sent to the same circle as I was sent. And they [officials] 
wouldn’t take money directly from me – it will be a bribe in this case”.
(director of firm, cargo owner)
Strangers are not allowed in customs-broker relationships. Customs officials working in 
different departments are well acquainted with “their” brokers, who act as their “bread-winners.” 
The amount of informal “agreed” payments depends on the status of the customs official as well 
as on the scale of the deal. Regular inspectors’ “rates” are $100-300 per deal, but for a large-scale 
operation the amount of payments can reach thousands of dollars, especially if top level officials 
are involved. The higher the bureaucratic level of the involved official the bigger is the informal 
payment and the more reliable and profitable is the deal7.
7 It should be mentioned here that in cases that were reported by our informants the level of involved officials was not as high 
because of the small size of the businesses and, correspondingly, consignments of goods involved.
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Trustworthy contacts and partnerships are carefully cultivated by both sides, customs 
officials and customs brokers. It is almost impossible to trace all of the informal interactions and 
relationships that go beyond direct payments or cash flows between them:
Obviously, a relative [of a customs official] or a trustee can become a broker, and that’s 
how brokers raise money. Because of these gray schemas. And the basis for these schemas is 
relationships of mutual trust with customs. If I am a relative of a commander of the customs 
post, than he knows for sure that this is not a control from above or a police inspection, that 
I will clearly “unfasten” from each cargo $300 for him (for a small cargo shipment). And 
suddenly some guys come over from somewhere. And he doesn’t know whether this is control 
or not – why should he help them? … There are lots of interactions in customs, and for those 
who know the real structure of this business – everything goes through trustworthy – very-
very trustworthy – persons.
Informal relationships between custom brokers and clients also penetrate the whole procedure 
of drawing up the Customs Cargo Declaration, although this is a strictly formalized document. This 
refers first of all to “agreed payments” that are negotiated between customs broker and “declarant’ 
(cargo owner). There were no informants in our study who confine their relationships with customs 
broker to formal payments. Even in case of one-time (or occasional) customs clearance you have to 
pay some money for “establishing good relationships with customs.”
The role of informal relationships with customs is even more explicit in the answers to the 
question, what businessmen consider to be a “good customs broker”, how they choose a partner.
Q: OK, what is a good customs broker for you?
A: Somebody who has kinship or close trustworthy relationships with customs officials. He 
might have good relationships with the Department of Custom Costs Control or with the 
customs chief. The variants can be different, various relationships. But the main thing is 
trustworthy relationships with customs.
During the study we were interested in how new or non-established businesspeople look 
for customs brokers to serve as partners, and how they become acquainted with the informal 
possibilities of reducing customs costs. The search for partners usually begins with gathering 
information from open sources - from official websites or newspaper advertising or in the Yellow 
Pages guide. Then they phone the firms that they find – the first information that they get through 
these conversations is usually unclear and confusing.8 The partnerships formed in this way are 
rarely successful. The most fruitful way of finding a partner is to use recommendations provided 
by firms or businesspeople who are well experienced in dealing with customs brokers. These 
businesspeople often joke ironically about those newcomers who try to solve their problems in 
official way – using the Yellow Pages or other official sources of information.
It is apparent that the system of informal mediation between businessmen (cargo owners) 
and customs is deeply incorporated into formal legal framework. As long as the law provides the 
8 We also tried to phone to some firms indicated in Yellow Pages as customs brokers, pretending that we are businesspeople 
who need to convey dome paint from Finland, and we were trying to find out how much would it cost to do the customs 
clearance. The usual answer was – come down to our office and we’ll talk about it in person.
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possibility for cargo carriers to do customs clearance without resort to official (“white”) customs 
brokers there will always be space for “gray” custom brokerage activities. Perhaps for this reason, 
“gray” custom brokers are not much concerned with the ongoing reformation of the customs 
legislation, and are sure that they will continue to survive regardless of the strictness of legislative 
norms. The scale of informal customs brokers’ mediation can be indirectly estimated from the 
following figures: According to official statistics only 30% of cargo goes through customs brokers, 
while 70% is reported directly by declarants (www.custom-house.ru). According to the estimates 
of some experts, only 5-20% of cargo passes customs clearance through “white” schema, while the 
rest crosses the border using “gray” schemas of various kinds (Barsukova, 2002).
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Shuttle Traders and Tourist Firms
Shuttle trading represents an informal economic sector in which individual traders bring 
small consignments of goods across the border. The shuttle-trade business has been acknowledged 
as a large-scale and meaningful phenomenon in Russian economy since the early-mid nineties. 
People from various demographic categories of population were involved in these economic 
activities, which were new for Russia at the time. For some people this experience provided the 
basis (both financial and social) for further development of their own trade businesses. For others 
it was only a chance to survive or to improve their financial situation temporarily. Shuttle traders 
brought goods to the Russian market from Poland, Italy, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, China, 
South Korea and other countries. Goods brought by small cross-border traders are reported to 
make up about 20 - 25% of all Russian imports, and up to 60-75% of sales in certain categories of 
consumer goods (such as footwear, clothes, etc.). The situation has changed somewhat since the 
mid-nineties. However, according to the Institute of International Economic and Political Studies 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2002), over 5 million people in Russia are still involved in the 
shuttle-trading business, adding annually 12-15% to the volume of official foreign trade in Russia, 
which constitutes about $ 20-25 billion.9
shuttle trading in st. petersburg
Finland has always been one of the most attractive countries for St. Petersburg shuttle 
traders because of its geographical closeness to St. Petersburg. Finnish commodities were 
always highly valued by Soviet people for their high quality, and tourist trips to Finland during 
the Soviet times were among the most prestigious and highly prized. Shop-tours to Finland as 
a particular form of tourism appeared in St. Petersburg at the beginning of the nineties and 
boomed in the period of 1994-1996. Accordingly, the tourist market in St. Petersburg was divided 
into two sectors: “intellectual” tourism and “shopping” tourism. Many firms were established 
specializing exclusively in shop-tours to Finland, and even big “intellectual” tourist firms had 
special departments (or guides) specializing in this type of tours.
Individual shuttle traders go from St. Petersburg to Helsinki, Lapperanta, Imatra and 
other towns in Finland. They buy different kinds of goods (most of all cleansers, washing powder, 
second hand clothes, ironing-boards and dryers) and foods (coffee and fish) in Finland to sell in St. 
9 Butuzova, L. Moskva. Velokij chelnochnyj put’. Moskovskie novosti, 2002-11-12.
http://www.cotton.ru/cgi-bin/vestnik/article.pl?id=11823
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Petersburg. The cost of the trip to Finland by shuttle-bus is very low– 12-15 EUR for a round trip 
ticket by bus, or 25-30 EUR by minibus per person. But as a matter of fact shuttle traders manage 
to avoid even these expenditures: the money earned by selling two packs of Russian cigarettes 
in Finland (only one pack is allowed by custom regulations) would completely cover the cost 
of the bus ticket. They sell the cigarettes at the first bus stop just after crossing the border at the 
supermarket called “Shajba” (hockey puck) very close to the border, which got its name due to the 
round shape of the building. Usually somebody in the bus (in most cases the tour guide herself or 
himself) gathers all the cigarettes and sells them through their personal local “channels” – familiar 
shadow cigarette traders, who are in most cases former Russian citizens living in Finland. These 
traders come to Shajba every day at the time of the shuttle-buses’ arrival. This business appears to 
be very well developed and works as a more or less seamless system.
A regular shop tour to Helsinki usually lasts for one day. Every night at 10 p.m. about ten 
big tourist buses start on their trip and come back to St. Petersburg next evening. Shuttle traders 
spend the night in the bus, arrive to Helsinki in the early morning, spend several hours shopping 
and start back to St. Petersburg at 1 p.m. On the way back to the border the bus stops at various 
shopping centers and hyper-markets, gathering traders that were doing shopping there. The time 
of arrival to St. Petersburg depends on how successful the procedure of crossing the border is 
carried out. If no problems with customs emerge, the bus returns to St. Petersburg about 8 p.m. 
There are also longer tours which last two to three days, in which case traders stay at hostels and 
private apartments in Finland.
Shuttle trading appears to be a physically exhausting enterprise – usually traders go on tours 
two to three times a week in order to make a full use of a multiple-entry visa. The overwhelming 
majority of shuttle traders are women of different ages – usually there are maximum one or two 
males (if any) out of 30-40 traders in a bus. Tour guides are also almost all women. So it can be 
stated that shuttle trading is a women’s business in St. Petersburg.
Based on our participant observation, two types of shuttle traders operating in the field of 
informal cross-border trading can be distinguished. Small traders, individuals who do not own 
their own businesses, represent the first type. They sell imported commodities through personal 
networks - to their friends and co-workers, or through some retail shops. Another example of 
small shuttle trading involves some person regularly supplying some small producers with various 
accessories (for instance, small shipyards regularly send shuttle traders to Finland for component 
parts of yacht equipment). Small traders usually do not bring large quantities of goods across the 
border, so they do not fundamentally break the weight limits, which allow 50 kilograms per person 
as purchase for individual consumption (wholesale purchase is not permitted at all). Usually small 
traders cooperate with each other in order to get price reductions and tax-free checks or “invoices” 
(a service provided by some shops for shuttle traders giving them the opportunity to get some 
money back for their next purchase).
The second type of shuttle traders can be called “wholesale traders”. They often have their 
own shops or stalls at market places (usually open air markets, but not exclusively), so they make 
wholesale purchases. Usually they buy certain types of goods, and the consignments of these goods 
are often considerably exceed the weight and quantity restrictions on imported commodities 
according to custom regulations. Wholesale traders are more individualized as compared with 
small traders, they do not need anyone to cooperate to get reduction. At the same time, they form 
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a more coherent group in the bus because they need to consolidate in order to “fix the problems” 
that regularly occur with customs officials at the Russian border, in other words, they cooperate 
to collect the bribe to be given to the customs official.
Both small and wholesale shuttle-traders bring commodities across the border as “goods 
for personal consumption”, so they do not pay any customs duties and therefore they do not need 
any customs brokerage assistance. However, since shuttle-traders regularly break custom rules 
regarding the weight and the amount of goods can be brought across the border, they always need 
some mediating structure or person to solve the problems that arise between them and custom 
officials. The role of mediation is performed by tourist firms, or to be more precise, by tourist 
guides who organize the trip.
tourist firms as informal mediators
There are two main intermediary functions of tourist firms that are based on informal 
(or semi-formal) activities: assisting shuttle traders in getting visas and solving problems with 
customs while crossing the border. For a long period – since the very beginning of shuttle-trading 
business in St. Petersburg – the major role of tourist firms was to provide shuttle traders with 
visas and insurance. Although these functions were based exclusively on formal relationships 
with the Finnish Consulate, providing shuttle-traders with visas can nonetheless be called a semi-
informal service since the tourist trip as such was fictitious and the main purpose was to simplify 
the procedure of getting visa. In nineties in order to get even a one-entrance visa to Finland it 
was necessary to provide an invitation from some person or organization in Finland or a hotel 
reservation. Tourist firms used their official status, and cultivated relationships with the Finnish 
Consulate, allowing them to get visas without any difficulty. Of course, tourist firms also provided 
traders with a bus and a group leader who was accordingly called “a guide” (although she/he was 
never supposed to provide “tourists” with any excursions).
As a matter of fact, there were no problems in crossing Russian border at that time – the 
rules and restrictions for imported cargo had not yet been developed. Crossing the Finnish border 
was more problematic since shuttle traders tried to bring to Finland large quantities of alcohol and 
cigarettes for sale. As customs rules regarding imported goods became more strict some tourist 
firms (specializing in shop-tours) had to “solve problems at customs” in order to proceed with 
shopping tourism. In our study we have not got evidence about any direct relationships between 
tourist firms and customs, but interviews with tourist guides provided a lot of examples of indirect 
“breeding” of customs officials. Our informants reported that on every holiday they brought gifts to 
customs officials on behalf of their firms. Tourist guides often bring some goods from Finland for 
some familiar customs official (on their order) in order to maintain to keep good relationships. All 
these strategies were aimed toward cultivating informal relationships with custom officials allowing 
the firm to avoid inspection of the bus on the way back from Finland.
Today the content of informal functions performed by tourist firms has been changed 
fundamentally, mainly because of legislative changes and organizational changes in the business 
environment. On the one hand, because of the simplification of the procedure of getting a 
Finnish visa, the role of tourist firms in this area has diminished dramatically. Since 2002 one 
can apply for a one-year multiple-entry visa without any invitation or hotel reservation – it is 
enough for applicants to write that they are going to Finland for shopping or as a tourist. This 
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procedure has become simple and well organized, and the intermediary functions of the tourist 
firms are no longer required: people simply apply for the visa themselves. On the other hand, 
the constant toughening of customs rules and regulations has increased the role of informal 
mediation at the border crossings. Here the role of the tour guide as an intermediary between 
shuttle traders and customs officials has been increased.
Changes in the informal functions of tourist firms have caused the landscape of the tourist 
business in St. Petersburg to be transformed. Since the role of a tourist firm in organizing shopping 
tours has been narrowed down to renting a bus and providing a guide, there is no longer any need 
for a tourist firm to operate as a complete organizational entity. Many “shopping tourism” firms 
have been transformed into “virtual” firms – they do not have any office, formal staff, or equipment. 
The only thing that such a “tourist agency” director needs is a telephone. They rent buses from 
transportation firms, hire bus drivers and recruit a group of “tourists” via traders’ networks. The 
director of such a virtual firm often works as a guide, operating at the same time a shuttle trader. 
Now the role of a shopping tour firm (if any) is basically organizational and is limited to the 
preparation of the tour – finding and providing a bus and a guide. All of the procedures around 
the tour itself, including crossing the border and mediating between shuttle traders and the border 
guards and custom officials, are accomplished by the guide. For shuttle traders, the name of a firm 
matters less than the name of the guide. They prefer to work continuously with the same guide. If 
a guide switches to another firm, then most of the guide’s clients follow along.
the role of the guide
The role of the guide can be divided into two parts - organizational and intermediary. The 
organizational function of a guide is rather explicit. She or he is supposed to gather people and fill 
the bus (more people – more money for the guide and the firm), and work out the route, identifying 
hyper-markets and shops to be visited in Finland. Sometimes the route is fixed before the trip, and 
sometimes it is corrected according to the needs and wishes of the shuttle traders. In the latter case 
a guide is expected to find a balance between the interests of all the passengers. She is also supposed 
to look after her passengers during the tour (to prevent quarrels and conflicts among shuttle traders), 
to gather documents at the border and to communicate with border guards and customs officials.
The intermediary role of a guide is not as obvious and often hidden for people who are 
unfamiliar with the procedure. It starts when the bus comes to the Russian border crossing and 
becomes more apparent if the group confronts problems at customs. Passing the customs inspection 
on the way back is the most critical point of the tour and the guide plays a major role in this 
procedure. Since custom officers – as they tell us in our interviews – can always (!) find something 
done in a wrong way, the main task of the guide is to ensure the speed of passing the customs 
inspection, which usually means convincing the customs official not to inspect the bus. So the role 
of the guide is crucial here. Her or his experience, personal contacts and personal characteristics 
do matter: the task is easier when the guide is familiar with the customs officials and has good 
relationships with them. The role of the guide is also important if custom officials find any other 
violation of the rules – e.g. smuggling. In this case the all of the passengers on the bus would be 
arrested and the guide would be expected to stay at customs until the incident is over.
The significance of organizational and intermediary functions of the guide is different for 
different types of tours and shuttle traders. For groups of small traders, the so-called “cigarette 
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traders” (sounds like “cigarette-case” in Russian) who mainly bring small amounts of goods, 
using the cigarette “business” to cover their travel expenses, the role of the guide is primary 
organizational. As a matter of fact these groups do not stop at many markets and shops, therefore 
their buses are the first to come to the border on the way back. As a rule, they do not have many 
troubles with Russian customs since they do not bring many goods.
Another type is “shopniki” - arrant shuttle traders (or mixed groups combining small traders 
and wholesale traders). These groups stop at every shop, therefore the bus is always overloaded 
with commodities; it comes to the border very late in the evening and the passengers often have 
problems with customs. For this kind of group the intermediary role of the guide is most important. 
From our interviews with guides, two basic intermediary strategies can be distinguished. The first 
one can be called “preventing,” in which the guide bribes the customs official in order to prevent 
inspection of the bus. This strategy is used by guides of wholesale traders’ groups when the bus is 
heavily overloaded, and violations of norms are apparent even without the special procedure of 
weighing. In this case the intermediary function of the guide is crucial – he\she is the only person 
who can give the bribe to the customs official. Informal relations between the guide and customs 
officials are very important here since they are used for facilitating bribe giving. Custom officials 
would never take a bribe from a stranger. In an interview with a person who tried to work as a 
guide but failed to give a bribe, she explained her failure by the fact that the customs official did 
not know her personally. This case also confirms assumption that this is the guide who is a real and 
very significant intermediary between traders and customs officials, while the firm plays mainly an 
organizational role. The name of the firm, which was well known to the custom officials, did not 
play any significant role in the described situation – the customs official was afraid to take money 
from an unfamiliar guide. So personal connections count among the professional and personal 
characteristics of the guide that are crucial for successful corrupt mediation.
Another strategy is to avoid bribes and to cross the border using only good relationships 
with customs officials. This strategy is used by the guides of “mixed” groups, when violation 
of norms is not as obvious and the official on duty is not as rigorous. Regardless of the chosen 
strategy the guide is always ready to pay the bribe. Money for a bribe is collected by the guide from 
all passengers-traders. Usually the size of bribes is calculated as a percentage of the money that 
traders get back as tax-free or via the invoice system, usually it is about 200-300 EUR per bus. The 
collected money is put into the carrier customs declaration, by which the contents of the entire 
bus are declared, and submitted to the customs official by the guide.
Informal relations between the guide and customs officials are of key importance for both 
strategies (this is one reason why buses often hurry to the border in order to arrive before a familiar 
customs official goes off shift). Tour guides carefully foster these relationships by means of small 
presents and gifts, which they bring to customs officials from time to time. Of major importance 
here is the need to create a good reputation as a trustworthy and responsible partner. This means 
that the guide is expected to never allow prohibited goods to be brought in her or his bus, to fulfill all 
of the formal requirements so that the customs inspection procedure is made easy for the customs 
official. The goal is for the customs official to recognize a guide who signifies: “everything is fine with 
this bus because everything is always fine with this guide.” Custom officials also benefit from such 
trustworthy relationships with guides because they save them inspection time and bring welcome 
gifts and money. The best case is when the guide finally gets the phone number of the official so that 
she can check up on the “situation at customs” over the phone while approaching the border.
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Sometimes it happens that customs officials do not take bribes for various reasons: they 
are afraid of inspection and law enforcement, or they work together with the SWAT soldiers, or 
for some other reason. Sometimes they are required to inspect the bus by the planned schedule of 
regular bus inspections. If the bribe is not accepted, the traders in the bus get very angry with the 
guide because this means he or she did not fulfill his or her main duty.
When the money is not taken by the custom official and the bus is checked, the function of 
a guide is to soften the situation. This means that the guide has to negotiate with customs officials 
about the amount of the fine to be paid by traders for extra weight – the most frequent violation 
identified by customs officials. The main task of the guide is to reduce the sum of the fine as much 
as possible. According to our interviews, usually the fine is decreased by 50-70% after negotiations 
with customs.
Our findings allow us to conclude that the role of tourist firms as intermediaries in shuttle 
trading has decreased, because regulations in the sphere of tourism between St. Petersburg and 
Finland have been changed recently and became easier to navigate and understand. As a result, 
the need for the mediation functions of the firms does not exist any more. This is a good example 
of how simplification of the official procedures allowed avoiding intermediary services in one 
sector of interaction between businesspeople and the state.
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Institutionalization of  
Informal Mediation
We would argue that currently, informal mediation in relationships between businesspeople 
and authorities is going through a process of institutionalization. In this part of the paper we 
will try to demonstrate that the phenomenon of informal mediation has developed during the 
past years into sustainable informal institution that has come to occupy a stable position in the 
Russian economic environment.
informal mediation as social institution
According to the theory of institutionalization developed by Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann (Berger and Luckmann, 1996) the essence of institutionalization is the 
reduction of uncertainty in the external environment, making it more predictable for people 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1996: 54). Based on empirical data obtained during the studies we 
consider institutionalization of informal mediation through the processes of habitualization, 
typification, objectivation and legitimation of interactions between businesspeople and informal 
intermediaries.
The emergence and formation of the institution of informal mediation is preceded by the 
habitualization of informal economic practices in the Russian business environment, where 
infringement (or avoidance) of formal rules and regulations has become a generally accepted 
norm of economic activity. The prevalence of informal relations in vertical interactions – between 
businesspeople and officials – is predetermined by the imperfection of the bureaucratic system, 
and by the impracticability of formal regulations. It is widely acknowledged that the legislative 
environment in Russia does not facilitate business development, particularly for small and medium 
sized business. The most typical expression from interviews with businesspeople is “If you had 
not been violating the rules… If you had been playing fair, then it would have been better not to be 
working at all.” As it follows from our study, “informal stimulation” of officials of different ranks 
in order to overcome bureaucratic barriers has become a routine practice in everyday economic 
activities.
As informal practices become habitualized, the most effective of them become crystallized, 
with their further transformation into typical patterns of behavior. Our study provides empirical 
evidence that using intermediaries for informal interactions with officials has become such 
a typical pattern for Russian businesspeople. The reasons for using informal intermediaries’ 
services are the following:
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a) Businesspeople prefer to deal with intermediaries because it is simpler (intermediaries 
know all the details and hidden dangers of this process) and faster (anyway it saves time and 
therefore - money).
Ok, in order to register the agreement for all these premises for rent, I went to officials…one, 
two…- oh, this will be the eighth visit. In June I started my visits to these officials, spent 
overall 16 hours, today it is already October – five months have passed! And no result so far... 
It is better to do it through the agency, formerly we paid them $1000 and they did everything 
in one month. I don’t know how we will do it…
(director of a trading firm)
In fact there are two ways for businesspeople to solve a “bureaucratic” problem. The direct 
way means applying to the official body trying to fulfill all formal legal requirements. This way 
can take an extremely long time and the result is not guaranteed. Another way is the indirect way, 
operating through intermediary structures, which is faster and less time-consuming. As a result 
one can see the double-faced strategy that businesspeople often use in their relationships with 
officials: if the problem is urgent and vitally important for a firm they choose the more expensive 
but faster and more “reliable” indirect method. In cases of less urgency – the long method of 
navigating one’s own way through bureaucratic procedures.
b) Using intermediaries makes it possible to avoid emotional strain, which is usually a 
painful part of the interpersonal communication between businesspeople and officials, and not 
only in cases where it is necessary to solve the problem using informal means:
“I want to say that every official - depending on his upbringing, his intellect and I don’t know 
what else to a greater or lesser degree - would necessarily smear you on the table. If he is a cad, 
then he will be actively doing this. If he is a well-brought-up, then he will be doing this by his 
indifference. None of them cares about you!”
(director of a dressmaking establishment)
When a businessperson goes to an intermediary, the situation is different – it takes the 
shape of formal service and businesspeople feel like customers in that case. So it can be stated 
that by using intermediary services businesspeople reduce the “emotional costs” of informal 
interactions with officials.
c) Not least important, using informal intermediaries reduces the uncertainty of the situation, 
and increases its predictability. According to our respondents, intermediaries make the whole 
system of interactions between business and authorities “more clear”. Of course, this does not imply 
that the procedures of the bureaucratic body are more transparent, but rather that intermediaries 
are uniquely positioned to offer a better understanding of the steps that businesspeople need to 
undertake in order to effectively achieve their goals in interacting with state institutions.
The study provides empirical evidence of objectivation of informal mediation. In some 
spheres the set of informal mediation institutions has a sort of coercive power over individual 
behavior. Using the services provided by intermediaries has become, if not obligatory, then vitally 
necessary for businesspeople if they want to run business without troubles. This can be seen from 
different cases of failed attempts to avoid using intermediary services. One of the most vivid 
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examples is when businesspeople try to do custom clearance directly through customs bodies 
avoiding the services of intermediaries:
The way through the customs – it is just horrible! We were doing everything by ‘a white scheme’. 
The system works as follows – we try to do everything fairly, paying all customs duties and so 
on. But the customs rules and customs laws are very complicated, they can object to anything, 
and won’t let a commodity through. But it can be done very easily ... We tried once to go 
through customs procedures using a ‘gray’ scheme. And it turned out to be much easier and 
much cheaper. And now we are thinking: what for? Why have we suffered so much for five 
years? Every time we bring a commodity through customs it costs four days of my life.
(director of a shop)
The above quotation explicitly demonstrates how “white” business is being converted 
into the gray zone under the pressure of institutionalized informal relationships in the business 
environment.
Institutions require legitimation, which is “ways by which they can be explained and 
justified” (Berger and Luckmann, 1996: 61). The leitmotif of all explanations of our informants 
regarding the existence of intermediaries is that they are created by officials themselves to produce 
additional profits. Our informants are deeply convinced that intermediary firms are specially 
created by officials themselves in order to get additional “informal” payments for avoiding 
impracticable and intricate bureaucratic rules. Some of our informants are even sure that people 
who work in these structures are in close kinship or friendship relations with officials. In general, 
businesspeople perceive intermediaries as an “objective necessity” of the business environment 
and accept them as such. Justification of informal intermediaries is based on their convenience for 
businesspeople. Even with the high price of mediation services they provide for businesspeople 
the real possibility of solving problems and economizing on other expenses.
economic essence of informal mediation
The informal character of intermediaries’ functions makes it difficult to use North’s 
institutional economic approach for this analysis. Under the category of informal institutions, North 
emphasizes cultural and historical factors hindering the implementation of economic rationality 
(North, 1997). Although cultural and historical contexts play an important role in economic 
behavior, the role of informality (understood as the operation of informal rules and practices) 
cannot be confined to the effect of cultural context. Numerous studies of the informal economy in 
post-socialist transitional economies, including this one, have demonstrated that the infringement 
of formal rules, and the emergence of informal conventional agreements that regulate interactions 
between economic actors, facilitate economic rationality. The process of deformalization of rules 
taking place in the Russian business environment (Radaev, 2001) implies the incorporation of 
informal rules into formal institutions, and the replacement of formal regulations with informal 
ones. From this perspective, informal institutions appear more as rational “devices” to increase 
economic rationality than as cultural and historical conditions and “rules that are imposed by 
individuals on themselves to limit maximizing behavior” (North, 1997).
From the perspective of a transaction costs approach, the economic essence of the institution 
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of informal intermediaries is seen as assisting businesspeople to reduce transaction costs related 
to complying with formal bureaucratic rules and regulations. Transaction costs of this kind exist 
in any economy, that is why in every country one can find intermediaries serving businesspeople 
in overcoming bureaucratic barriers and fulfilling official regulations and requirements. Their 
existence is predetermined by at least two factors:
Formal rules never correspond completely to economic reality; there is always a 
discrepancy between the economic ideology standing behind formal rules that are developed 
by the state, and the economic interests of some groups of economic actors, who are expected to 
comply with formal rules. So expert consulting is needed in order to optimize economic behavior 
to fit formal requirements.
The character of formal rules is too intricate in practice, therefore expert knowledge is 
needed for interpretation of formal rules and assistance in fitting formal requirements.
Organizations that can be referred to as mediating structures include various consulting 
and auditing firms serving businesspeople in their relationships with fiscal bodies, customs 
brokers, licensing and certification agencies and other specialized firms assisting businesspeople 
in their interactions with various official bodies. The same kinds of organizations seem to operate 
in the Russian economy. However, our study has proved that the content of services provided by 
intermediaries operating in the Russian business environment differs from their analogues in the 
West. One of the most important differences involves the role of informality in their activities. 
Our empirical data indicate that the informal component of mediating functions, through 
which informal access to official bodies is maintained, plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of 
mediating functions.
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Particularities of Intermediaries
in the Russian Context
It is possible to distinguish some particularities of the Russian socio-economic context that 
make the role of intermediaries different. While it is certainly true that formal rules never correspond 
completely to economic reality, in transforming societies (and in Russia in particular) this gap is 
even more essential. In the model proposed by North (1997), the process of formalization is seen 
as a step subsequent to institutionalization, with the purpose of legitimating rules and practices 
that developed over the course of institutionalization. This process is more typical for the American 
pattern of relationships between business and the state, which is predetermined by a long history of 
American social and economic development. In Russia we can see quite the opposite process at work 
in the development and implementation of formal institutions – change does not develop organically, 
but is imposed “from above.” The elaboration of new economic laws in Russia is very often primarily 
predetermined by the goal of corresponding to western patterns and models of the market economy, 
and does not take into consideration the correspondence of legal regulation to the real economic 
situation. This is aggravated by the lack of professional and expert knowledge to develop laws and 
regulations appropriate to the transforming economy.
Another particularity refers to organizational embodiment of formal institutions, which is 
poor for a variety reasons – the lack of financial resources provided by the state for the organizational 
implementation of formal regulations and the lack of highly qualified specialists, among other 
factors. That is why even “good” laws fail at the stage of their real implementation. The inefficiency 
of the organizational embodiment of formal institutions results in a situation in which the deficit of 
bureaucratic services paves the way toward corruption and informal mediation.
The informalization of the economic environment provides the basis for flourishing of 
informal intermediaries. The practice of concealment of profits and economic operations provides 
businesspeople with “black cash” resources, which in turn facilitates informal interactions with 
intermediaries.
All of what is presented above can be interpreted to suggest that informal intermediaries in 
the Russian business environment function either as an instrument for bureaucratic extortion or as 
a form of latent resistance of business against aggressive state policy. Unlike their analogues in the 
West, informal intermediaries in Russia do not serve for adjusting economic practices to formal 
rules, but rather for creating a false impression of correspondence between the former and the latter. 
In practice, intermediaries function to alter formal procedures in a way that brings them into closer 
correspondence with real economic practices. The principal resource they use for this purpose is 
informal access to various bureaucratic bodies.
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